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Abstract. With more than 300 million cards sold, HID iClass is one of the most
popular contactless smart cards on the market. It is widely used for access control,
secure login and payment systems. The card uses 64-bit keys to provide authen-
ticity and integrity. The cipher and key diversification algorithms are proprietary
and little information about them is publicly available.
In this paper we have reverse engineered all security mechanisms in the card in-
cluding cipher, authentication protocol and key diversification algorithms, which
we publish in full detail. Furthermore, we have found six critical weaknesses that
we exploit in two attacks, one against iClass Standard and one against iClass
Elite (a.k.a., iClass High Security). In order to recover a secret card key, the
first attack requires one authentication attempt with a legitimate reader and 222
queries to a card. This attack has a computational complexity of 240 MAC com-
putations. The whole attack can be executed within a day on ordinary hardware.
Remarkably, the second attack which is against iClass Elite is significantly faster.
It directly recovers the master key from only 15 authentication attempts with a
legitimate reader. The computational complexity of this attack is lower than 225
MAC computations, which means that it can be fully executed within 5 seconds
on an ordinary laptop.
1 Introduction
iClass is an ISO/IEC 15693 [ISO09] compatible contactless smart card manufactured
by HID Global. It was introduced in the market back in 2002 as a secure replacement
of the HID Prox card which did not have any cryptographic capabilities. According
to the manufacturer, more than 300 million iClass cards have been sold. These cards
are widely used in access control of secured buildings such as The Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, the International Airport of Mexico City and the United States Navy base
of Pearl Harbor [Cum06] among many others3. Other applications include secure user
authentication such as in the naviGO system included in Dell’s Latitude and Precision
laptops; e-payment like in the FreedomPay and SmartCentric systems; and billing of
electric vehicle charging such as in the Liberty PlugIns system. iClass has also been
incorporated into the new BlackBerry phones which support Near Field Communication
(NFC).
iClass uses a proprietary cipher to provide data integrity and mutual authentication
between card and reader. The cipher uses a 64-bit diversified key which is derived from
3 http://hidglobal.com/mediacenter.php?cat2=2
a 56-bit master key and the serial number of the card. This key diversification algo-
rithm is built into all iClass readers. The technology used in the card is covered by US
Patent 6058481 and EP 0890157. The precise description of both the cipher and the
key diversification algorithms are kept secret by the manufacturer following the princi-
ples of security by obscurity. Remarkably, all iClass Standard cards worldwide share the
same master key for the iClass application. This master key is stored in the EEPROM
memory of every iClass reader. It is possible though to let HID generate and manage
a custom key for your system if you are willing to pay a higher price. The iClass Elite
Program (a.k.a., High Security) uses an additional key diversification algorithm and a
custom master key per system which according to HID provides “the highest level of
security” [HID09].
Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to the (in)security of the cryp-
tographic mechanisms used in contactless smart cards [GdKGM+08,COQ09,GvRVS10,
PN12]. Experience has shown that the secrecy of proprietary ciphers does not contribute
to its cryptographic strength. Most notably the Mifare Classic, which has widespread
application in public transport ticketing and access control systems, has been thor-
oughly broken in the last few years [NESP08,GdKGM+08,GvRVS09,Cou09,GvRVS10].
Other prominent examples include KeeLoq [Bog07, IKD+08, CBW08, KKMP09] and
Hitag2 [COQ09, SNC09] used in car keys and CryptoRF [GvRVS10, BKZ11, BGV+12]
used in access control and payment systems.
HID proposes iClass as a migration option for systems using Mifare Classic, boosting
that iClass provides “improved security, performance and data integrity”4. For almost
one decade after it was introduced to the market, the details of the security mechanisms
of iClass remained unknown.
Our contribution In this paper we have fully reverse engineered iClass’s proprietary
cipher and authentication protocol which we publish in full detail. This task is not
trivial since it was first necessary to bypass the read protection mechanisms of the
microcontroller used in the readers in order to retrieve its firmware. Furthermore we
have found serious vulnerabilities in the cipher that enable an attacker to recover the
secret key from the card by just wirelessly communicating with it. The potential impact
of this attack is vast since other vulnerabilities in the key diversification algorithm allow
an adversary to use this secret key to recover the master key, provided that he has
mild computational power. Additionally, we have reverse engineered the iClass Elite key
diversification algorithm which we describe in full detail. We show that this algorithm
has even more serious vulnerabilities than the standard key diversification algorithm,
allowing an attacker to directly recover the master key by simply communicating with a
legitimate iClass reader. Concretely, we propose two attacks: one against iClass Standard
and one against iClass Elite. Both attacks allow an adversary to recover the master key.
• The first attack exploits a total of four weaknesses in the cipher, key diversification
algorithm and implementation. In order to execute this attack the adversary first
needs to eavesdrop one legitimate authentication session between card and reader.
Then it runs 219 key updates and 222 authentication attempts with the card. This
takes less than six hours to accomplish when using a Proxmark III as a reader and
recovers 24 bits of the card key. Finally, off-line, the attacker needs to search for the
remaining 40 bits of the key. Having recovered the card key, the adversary gains full
4 http://www.hidglobal.com/pr.php?id=393
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control over the card. Furthermore, computing the master key from the card key is
as hard as breaking single DES [GdKGV11].
• The second attack concerning iClass Elite exploits two weaknesses in the key diver-
sification algorithm and recovers the master key directly. In order to run this attack
the adversary only needs to run 15 authentication attempts with a legitimate reader.
Afterwards, off-line, the adversary needs to compute only 225 DES encryptions in
order to recover the master key. This attack, from beginning to end runs within 5
seconds on ordinary hardware.
We have executed both attacks in practice and verified these claims and attack times. For
eavesdropping and card emulation we used a Proxmark III5 which costs approximately
200 USD.
Related work Recently, Meriac proposed a procedure to read out the EEPROM of a
PIC microcontroller, like the ones used in iClass readers [Mer10]. The reverse engineering
process described here builds upon this work. Garcia, de Koning Gans and Verdult
in [GdKGV11] have reverse engineered the key diversification algorithm of iClass and
showed that it is possible to recover a master key when the adversary has full control
(i.e., can execute arbitrary commands) over a legitimate iClass reader. They also showed
that inverting the key diversification function in iClass is as hard as a chosen plaintext
attack on single DES.
During the course of our research Kim, Jung, Lee, Jung and Han have made a
technical report [KJL+11] available online describing independent reverse engineering
of the cipher used in iClass. Their research takes a very different, hardware oriented
approach. They recovered most of the cipher by slicing the chip and analyzing the
circuits with a microscope. Our approach, however, is radically different as our reverse
engineering is based on the disassembly of the reader’s firmware and the study of the
communication behavior of tags and readers. Furthermore, the description of the cipher
by Kim et al. is not correct. Concretely, their key byte selection function in the cipher
is different from the one used in iClass which results in incompatible keys.
Kim et al. have proposed two key recovery attacks. The first one is theoretical, in
the sense that it assumes that an attacker has access to a MAC oracle over messages
of arbitrary length. This assumption is unrealistic since neither the card nor the reader
provides access to such a powerful oracle. Their second attack requires full control over
a legitimate reader in order to issue arbitrary commands. Besides this assumption, it
requires 242 online authentication queries which, in practice, would take more than
710 years to gather. Our attacks, however, are practical in the sense that they can be
executed within a day and require only wireless communication with a genuine iClass
card/reader.
Overview This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a description of the
iClass architecture, the functionality of the card, the cipher, the authentication protocol
and the key diversification algorithm. Section 2.6 describes four weakness in the cipher,
key diversification algorithm and implementation of iClass. All these weaknesses are ex-
ploited in Section 2.7 were we propose a key recovery attack against iClass. Section 3
studies iClass Elite. We first describe its key diversification algorithm and then we de-
scribe two weaknesses which are later exploited in Section 3.3 to mount an attack that
recovers the master key. Finally, Section 4 gives concluding remarks.
5 http://www.proxmark.org
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2 iClass
An HID iClass card is in fact a pre-configured and re-branded PicoPass card produced by
Inside Secure6. HID configures and finalizes the cards so that the configuration settings
can no longer be modified. This section describes in detail the functionality and security
mechanisms of iClass and it also describes the reverse engineering process. Let us first
introduce notation.
Notation 2.1 Throughout this paper ǫ denotes the empty bitstring. ⊕ denotes exclusive
or. ⊞ denotes addition modulo 256. Given two bitstrings x and y, xy denotes their
concatenation. Sometimes we write this concatenation explicitly with x · y to improve
readability. x denotes the bitwise complement of x. 0n denotes a bitstring of n zero-
bits. Furthermore, given a bitstring x ∈ (Fk2)
l, we denote with x[i] the i-th element
y ∈ Fk2 of x. We write yi to denote the i-th bit of y. For example, given the bitstring
x = 0x010203 ∈ (F82)3 and y := x[2] then y = 0x03 and y6 = 1.
Remark 1 (Byte representation). Throughout this paper, bytes are represented with their
most significant bit on the left. However, the least significant bit is transmitted first
over the air (compliant with ISO/IEC 15693). This is the same order in which the bits
are input to the cryptographic functions. In other words, 0x0a0b0c is transmitted and
processed as input 0x50d030.
2.1 Reverse engineering iClass
In order to reverse engineer the cipher and the key diversification algorithms, we have
first recovered the firmware from an iClass reader. For this we used a technique in-
troduced in [Mer10] and later used in [GdKGV11]. Next we will briefly describe this
technique.
iClass readers, as many other embedded devices, rely on the popular PIC microcon-
troller to perform their computations. These microcontrollers are very versatile and can
be flashed with a custom firmware. The (program) memory of the microcontroller is
divided into a number of blocks, each of them having access control bits determining
whether this block is readable/writable. Even when the PIC is configured to be non-
writable, it is always possible to reset the access control bits by erasing the memory of
the chip. At first glance this feature does not seem very helpful to our reverse engineer-
ing goals since it erases the data on the memory. Conveniently enough, even when the
most common programming environments do not allow it, the microcontroller supports
erasure of a single block. After patching the PIC programmer software to support this
feature, it is possible to perform the following attack to recover the firmware:
• Buy two iClass RW400 (6121AKN0000) readers.
• Erase block 0 on one of the readers. This resets the access control bits on block 0 to
readable, writable.
• Write a small dumper program on block 0 that reads blocks 1, . . . , n and outputs
the data via one of the microcontroller’s output pins.
• Use the serial port of a computer to record the data. This procedure recovers blocks
1, . . . , n.
6 http://www.insidesecure.com/eng/Products/Secure-Solutions/PicoPass
4
• Proceed similarly with the other reader, but erasing blocks 1, . . . , n. This in fact fills
each block with NOP operations.
• At the end of block n write a dumper program for block 0.
• At some point the program will jump to an empty block and then reach dumper
program that outputs the missing block 0.
Once we had recovered the firmware, it was possible to use IDA Pro and MPLAB to
reverse engineer the algorithms.
2.2 Functionality
iClass cards come in two versions called 2KS and 16KS with respectively 256 and 4096
bytes of memory. The memory of the card is divided into blocks of eight bytes as shown
in Figure 2.1. Memory blocks 0, 1, 2 and 5 are publicly readable. They contain the card
identifier id, configuration bits, the card challenge cC and issuer information. Block 3
and 4 contain two diversified cryptographic keys k1 and k2 which are derived from two
different master keys K1 and K2. These master keys are referred to in the documentation
as debit key and credit key. The card only stores the diversified keys k1 and k2. The
remaining memory blocks are divided into two areas, so-called applications. The size of
these applications is defined by the configuration block.
Block Content Denoted by
0 Card serial number Identifier id
1 Configuration
2 e-Purse Card challenge cC
3 Key for application 1 Diversified debit key k1
4 Key for application 2 Diversified credit key k2
5 Application issuer area
6. . . 18 Application 1 HID application
19. . .n Application 2 User defined memory
publicly readable
write-only after authentication
read-write after authentication
Fig. 2.1. Memory layout of an iClass card
The first application of an iClass card is the HID application which stores the card
identifier, PIN code, password and other information used in access control systems.
Read and write access to the HID application requires a valid mutual authentication
using the cipher to prove knowledge of k1. The master key of the HID application is a
global key known to all iClass Standard compatible readers. The globally used key K1
is kept secret by HID Global and is not shared with any customer or industrial partner.
Recovery of this key undermines the security of all systems using iClass Standard. Two
methods have been proposed [Mer10,GdKGV11] to recover this key. To circumvent the
obvious limitations of having only a global master key, iClass Elite uses a different key
diversification algorithm that allows having custom master keys. The details regarding
iClass Elite can be found in Section 3.
The second global master key K2 is used in both iClass Standard and Elite sys-
tems and it is available to any developer who signs a non-disclosure agreement with
HID global. It is possible to extract this key from publicly available software bina-
ries [GdKGV11]. In addition, the document [HID06] contains this master key and is
available online. This key K2 can be used by developers to protect the second applica-
tion, although in practice, K2 is hardly ever used or modified.
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The card provides basic memory operations like read and write. These operations
have some non-standard behavior and therefore we describe them in detail.
• The read command takes as input an application number a and a memory block
number n and returns the memory content of this block. This command has the side
effect of selecting the corresponding key (k1 for application 1 or k2 for application
2) in the cipher and then it feeds the content of block n into the internal state of the
cipher. Cryptographic keys are not readable. When the block number n corresponds
to the address where a cryptographic key is stored, then read returns a bitstring of
64 ones.
• The write command takes as input a block number n, an eight-byte payload p and
a MAC of the payload MAC(k, n · p). When successful, it writes p in memory and
it returns a copy of p for verification purposes. This command has the side effect
of resetting the internal state of the cipher. In addition, when the block number n
corresponds to the address where a cryptographic key k is stored, the payload is
XORed to the previous value instead of overwriting it, i.e., it assigns k := k ⊕ p.
Therefore, in order to update a key k to k′, the reader must issue a write command
with k ⊕ k′ as payload. In this way the card will store k ⊕ k ⊕ k′ = k′ as the new key.
On the one hand, this particular key update procedure has the special feature that in
case an adversary eavesdrops a key update he is unable to learn the newly assigned key,
provided that he does not know k. On the other hand this introduces a new weakness
which we describe in Section 2.6.2.
Before being able to execute read or write commands on the protected memory
of a card, the reader needs to get access to the corresponding application by running a
successful authentication protocol described in Section 2.3. Cryptographic keys k1 and
k2 can be seen as part of application 1 and 2, respectively. This means that in order to
modify a key e.g., k1, the reader first needs to run a successful authentication with k1.
2.3 Authentication protocol
This section describes the authentication protocol between an iClass card and reader.
This protocol is depicted in Figure 2.2 and an example trace is shown in Figure 2.3. First,
during the anti-collision protocol, the reader learns the identity of the card id. Then,
id, cC
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
nR,MAC(k, cC · nR)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
MAC(k, cC · nR · 0
32)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2.2. Authentication protocol
the reader chooses an application and issues a read command on the card challenge
cC . This cC is called ‘e-purse’ in the iClass documentation [Con04] and it is a special
memory block in the sense that it is intended to provide freshness. In the next step, the
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reader issues an authenticate command. This command sends to the card a reader
nonce nR and a MAC of the card challenge cC concatenated with nR. Finally, the card
answers with a MAC of cC , nR followed by 32 zero bits. For more details on the MAC
function see Section 2.4. After a successful authentication on cC the reader is granted
read and write access within the selected application.
Origin Message Description
Reader 0C 00 73 33 Read identifier
Tag 47 47 6C 00 F7 FF 12 E0 Card serial number id
Reader 0C 01 FA 22 Read configuration
Tag 12 FF FF FF E9 1F FF 3C iClass 16KS configuration
Reader 88 02 Read cC and select k1
Tag FE FF FF FF FF FF FF FF Card challenge cC
Reader 05 00 00 00 00 1D 49 C9 DA Authenticate with nR = 0,MAC(k1, cC · nR)
Tag 5A A2 AF 92 Response MAC(k1, cC · nR · 032)
Reader 87 02 FD FF FF FF FF FF FF FF CF 3B D4 6A Write on block 02, cC − 1,MAC(k1, 02 · cC − 1)
Tag FF FF FF FF FD FF FF FF Update succesful
Fig. 2.3. Authenticate and decrement card challenge using k1 = 0xE033CA419AEE43F9
Remark 2. Since the card lacks a pseudo-random generator, the reader should decre-
ment cC after a successful authentication in order to provide freshness for the next
authentication, see Figure 2.3. Note that this is not enforced by the card.
2.4 The cipher
This section describes the cipher used in iClass. This cipher is interesting from an aca-
demic and didactic perspective as it combines two important techniques in the design
of stream ciphers from the 80s and beginning of the 90s, i.e., Fibonacci generators and
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs).
The internal state of the cipher consists of four registers. Two of them, which we
call left (l) and right (r) are part of the Fibonacci generator. The other two registers
constitute linear feedback shift registers top (t) and bottom (b).
Definition 1 (Cipher state). A cipher state of iClass s is an element of F402 consisting
of the following four components:
1. the left register l = (l0 . . . l7) ∈ F
8
2;
2. the right register r = (r0 . . . r7) ∈ F
8
2;
3. the top register t = (t0 . . . t15) ∈ F
16
2 .
4. the bottom register b = (b0 . . . b7) ∈ F
8
2.
The cipher has an input bit which is used (among others) during authentication to
shift in the card challenge cC and the reader nonce nR. With every clock tick a cipher
state s evolves to a successor state s′. Both LFSRs shift to the right and the Fibonacci
generator iterates using one byte of the key (chosen by the select(·) function) and the
bottom LFSR as input. During this iteration each of these components is updated,
receiving additional input from the other components of the cipher. With each iteration
the cipher produces one output bit. The following sequence of definitions describe the
cipher in detail; see also Figure 2.4.
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k[0]
k[1]
k[2]
k[3]
k[4]
k[5]
k[6]
k[7]
oooo
OOOO
M
U
X
select(·)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

⊞
⊞
⊕// //
OO
OO
OO
oo
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OO ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
//
⊕ //
⊕
⊕
//
// output
input

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
//
l r
b
t
Fig. 2.4. The iClass cipher. Solid lines represent byte operations while dotted lines represent
bit operations.
Definition 2. The feedback function for the top register T : F162 → F2 is defined by
T (x0x1 . . . . . . x15) = x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x14 ⊕ x15.
Definition 3. The feedback function for the bottom register B : F82 → F2 is defined by
B(x0x1 . . . x7) = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x7.
Definition 4 (Selection function). The selection function select : F2×F2×F
8
2 → F
3
2
is defined by
select(x, y, r) = z0z1z2
where
z0 = (r0 ∧ r2)⊕ (r1 ∧ r3)⊕ (r2 ∨ r4)
z1 = (r0 ∨ r2)⊕ (r5 ∨ r7)⊕ r1 ⊕ r6 ⊕ x⊕ y
z2 = (r3 ∧ r5)⊕ (r4 ∧ r6)⊕ r7 ⊕ x
Definition 5 (Successor state). Let s = 〈l, r, t, b〉 be a cipher state, k ∈ (F82)
8 be a
key and y ∈ F2 be the input bit. Then, the successor cipher state s
′ = 〈l′, r′, t′, b′〉 is
defined as
t′ := (T (t)⊕ r0 ⊕ r4)t0 . . . t14 l
′ := (k[select(T (t),y,r)] ⊕ b
′)⊞ l ⊞ r
b′ := (B(b)⊕ r7)b0 . . . b6 r
′ := (k[select(T (t),y,r)] ⊕ b
′)⊞ l
We define the successor function suc which takes a key k ∈ (F82)
8, a state s and an input
y ∈ F2 and outputs the successor state s
′. We overload the function suc to multiple bit
input x ∈ Fn2 which we define as
suc(k, s, ǫ) = s
suc(k, s, x0 . . . xn) = suc(k, suc(k, s, x0 . . . xn−1), xn)
Definition 6 (Output). Define the function output which takes an internal state s =<
l, r, t, b > and returns the bit r5. We also define the function output on multiple bits input
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which takes a key k, a state s and an input x ∈ Fn2 as
output(k, s, ǫ) = ǫ
output(k, s, x0 . . . xn) = output(s) · output(k, s
′, x1 . . . xn)
where s′ = suc(k, s, x0).
Definition 7 (Initial state). Define the function init which takes as input a key k ∈
(F82)
8 and outputs the initial cipher state s =< l, r, t, b > where
t := 0xE012 l := (k[0] ⊕ 0x4C)⊞ 0xEC
b := 0x4C r := (k[0] ⊕ 0x4C)⊞ 0x21
Definition 8 (MAC function). Define the function MAC : (F82)
8 × Fn2 → F
32
2 as
MAC(k,m) = output(k, suc(k, init(k),m), 032)
2.5 Key diversification
This section describes in detail the built-in key diversification algorithm of iClass. Besides
the obvious purpose of deriving a card key from a master key, this algorithm intends to
circumvent weaknesses in the cipher by preventing the usage of certain ‘weak’ keys.
In order to compute a diversified key, the iClass reader first encrypts the card identity
id with the master key K, using single DES. The resulting ciphertext is then input to a
function called hash0 which outputs the diversified key k.
k = hash0(DESenc(id,K))
Here the DES encryption of id with master key K outputs a cryptogram c of 64 bits.
These 64 bits are divided as c = 〈x, y, z[0], . . . , z[7]〉 ∈ F
8
2 × F
8
2 × (F
6
2)
8 which is used as
input to the hash0 function. This function introduces some obfuscation by performing
a number of permutations, complement and modulo operations, see Figure 2.5. Besides
that, it checks for and removes patterns like similar key bytes, which could produce
a strong bias in the cipher. Finally, the output of hash0 is the diversified card key
k = k[0], . . . , k[7] ∈ (F
8
2)
8.
k[1] k[2] k[3] k[7]k[4] k[6]k[5]k[0]
x y z[7] z[6] z[5] z[4] z[3] z[2] z[1] z[0]
{ { { { { { { {
Fig. 2.5. Schematic representation of the function hash0
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Remark 3. The DES implementation used in iClass is non-compliant with the NIST
standard [FIP99]. Concretely, iClass deviates from the standard in the way of represent-
ing keys. According to the standard, a DES key is of the form
〈k0 . . . k6p0, k7 . . . k13p1, . . . , k47 . . . k55p7〉
where k0 . . . k55 are the actual key bits and p0 . . . p7 are parity bits. Instead, in iClass a
DES key is of the form 〈k0 . . . k55p0 . . . p7〉.
The following sequence of definitions describe the function hash0 in detail. This function
is included here for the sake of completeness. The details over this construction are not
necessary to understand the attacks presented in Section 2.7 and Section 3.3.
Definition 9. Let the function check : (F62)
8 → (F62)
8 be defined as
check(z[0] . . . z[7]) = ck(3, 2, z[0] . . . z[3]) · ck(3, 2, z[4] . . . z[7])
where ck : N× N× (F62)
4 → (F62)
4 is defined as
ck(1,−1, z[0] . . . z[3]) = z[0] . . . z[3]
ck(i,−1, z[0] . . . z[3]) = ck(i− 1, i− 2, z[0] . . . z[3])
ck(i, j, z[0] . . . z[3]) =
{
ck(i, j − 1, z[0] . . . z[i] ← j . . . z[3]), z[i] = z[j];
ck(i, j − 1, z[0] . . . z[3]), otherwise.
Definition 10. Define the function permute : Fn2 × (F
6
2)
8 × N× N→ (F62)
8 as
permute(ǫ, z, l, r) = ǫ
permute(p0 . . . pn, z, l, r) =
{
(z[l] + 1) · permute(p0 . . . pn−1, z, l+ 1, r), pn = 1;
z[r] · permute(p0 . . . pn−1, z, l, r+ 1), otherwise.
Definition 11. Define the bitstring π ∈ (F82)
35 in hexadecimal notation as
π =0x0F171B1D1E272B2D2E333539363A3C474B
4D4E535556595A5C636566696A6C71727478
Each byte in this sequence is a permutation of the bitstring 00001111. Note that this
list contains only the half of all possible permutations. The other half can be computed
by taking the bit complement of each element in the list.
Finally, the definition of hash0 is as follows.
Definition 12. Let the function hash0 : F82 × F
8
2 × (F
6
2)
8 → (F82)
8 be defined as
hash0(x, y, z[0] . . . z[7]) = k[0] . . . k[7]
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where
z′[i] = (z[i] mod (63− i)) + i i = 0 . . . 3
z′[i+4] = (z[i+4] mod (64− i)) + i i = 0 . . . 3
zˆ = check(z′)
p =
{
π[x mod 35], x0 = 1;
π[x mod 35], otherwise.
z˜ = permute(p, zˆ, 0, 4)
k[i] =
{
yi · z˜[i] · pi + 1, yi = 1;
yi · z˜[i] · pi, otherwise.
i = 0 . . . 7
2.6 Weaknesses
This section describes weaknesses in the design and implementation of iClass. We present
four weaknesses that are later exploited in Section 2.7 to mount a key recovery attack.
2.6.1 Weak keys The cipher has a clear weakness when the three rightmost bits of
each key byte are the same. Let us elaborate on that.
Proposition 1. Let β be a bitstring of length three. Then, for all keys k ∈ F642 of the
form k = α[0]β . . . α[7]β with α[i] ∈ F
5
2 the cipher outputs a constant Cβ.
β Cβ = MAC(k, cC · nR)
000 BF 5D 67 7F
001 10 ED 6F 11
010 53 35 42 0F
011 AB 47 4D A0
100 F6 CF 43 36
101 59 7F 4B 58
110 1A A7 66 46
111 E2 D5 69 E9
Fig. 2.6. Corresponding MAC for
each value of β
This is due to the fact that only the three right-
most bits of register r define the output of the cipher
and only the rightmost bit of r influences register b.
But these, in turn, are only influenced by the three
rightmost bits of the key bytes. This means that the
5 leftmost bits of r and the 5 leftmost bits of each
key byte affect only the key byte selection, but for
the key under consideration this does not affect the
output. The same holds for cC and nR as they are
just input to the select(·) function. Figure 2.6 shows
the corresponding MAC value for each possible β.
The manufacturer seems to be aware of this feature
of the cipher since the function hash0, used in key
diversification, prevents such a key from being used.
Although, this weakness combined with the weakness described in Section 2.6.2 and
2.6.3 result in a vulnerability exploited in Section 2.7.
2.6.2 XOR key update weakness In order to update a card key, the iClass reader
does not simply send the new key to the card in the clear but instead it sends the
XOR of the old and the new key (See Section 2.2). This simple mechanism prevents
an attacker from eavesdropping the new key during key update. Although, this key
update mechanism introduces a new weakness, namely, it makes it possible to make
partial modifications to the existing key. A key update should be an atomic operation.
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Otherwise, it allows an adversary to split the search space in a time-memory trade-off.
Moreover, in case the cipher has some weak keys like the ones described in Section 2.6.1,
it allows an adversary to force the usage of one of these keys.
2.6.3 Privilege escalation weakness Several privilege escalation attacks have been
described in the literature [KSRW04, DDSW11]. The privilege escalation weakness in
iClass also concerns the management of access rights over an application within the
card. After a successful authentication for application 1 has been executed, the reader is
granted read and write access to this application. Then, it is possible to execute a read
command for a block within application 2 without loosing the previously acquired access
rights. More precisely, when a read command is issued for a block n within application
2, with n 6= cC , this returns a sequence of 64 ones which indicates that permission is
denied to read this block. Surprisingly, this read attempt on application 2 does not affect
the previously acquired access rights on application 1. This read command though, has
the side effect of loading the key k2 into the internal state of the cipher. In particular,
from this moment on the card accepts write commands on application 1 that have a
valid MAC computed using key k2.
2.6.4 Weak key diversification on iClass The key diversification algorithm on
iClass has been reverse engineered by Garcia et al. in [GdKGV11]. This algorithm uses
a combination of single DES and a proprietary function called hash0 as shown in Sec-
tion 2.5. Furthermore, the authors show that the function hash0 is not one-way nor
collision resistant. In fact they show that it is possible to compute the inverse function
hash0−1 having a modest amount (on average 4) of candidate pre-images. They also
show that once a card key is known, recovering an iClass master key is not harder than
a chosen plaintext attack on single DES.
After careful inspection of the function hash0 it becomes clear that this function
attempts to fix the weak key weakness presented in Section 2.6.1. The function hash0
makes sure that, when looking at the last bit of each key byte, exactly four of them
are zeros (and the other four of them are ones). Due to this restriction there are only
8!
(4!)2 = 70 possibilities for the last bits of each key byte, instead of 2
8 = 256, therefore
reducing the entropy of the key by 1.87 bits.
2.7 Key recovery attack on iClass
This section shows how the weaknesses described in Section 2.6 can be exploited. Con-
cretely, we propose an attack that allows an adversary to recover a card key by wirelessly
communicating with a card and a reader. Once the card key has been recovered, the
weak key diversification weakness described in Section 2.6.4 can be exploited in order
to recover the master key. Next, we describe the attack on the card key in detail.
In order to recover a target card key k1 from application 1, an attacker A proceeds
as follows. First, A eavesdrops a legitimate authentication trace on the e-purse with
key k1, while making sure that the e-purse is not updated. If the reader attempts to
update the e-purse, this can be prevented by playing as man-in-the-middle or by simply
jamming the e-purse update message. Next, the adversary replays this authentication
trace to the card. At this point the adversary gains read and write access to application
1. Although, in order to actually be able to write, the adversary still needs to send a
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valid MAC with k1 of the payload. To circumvent this problem, the adversary proceeds
as described in Section 2.6.3, exploiting the privilege escalation weakness. At this point
the adversary still has read and write access to application 1 but he is now able to
issue write commands using MACs generated with the known key k2 to write on
application 1. In particular, A is now able to modify k1 at will. Exploiting the XOR key
update weakness described in Section 2.6.2, the adversary modifies the card key k1 into
a weak key by setting the three rightmost bits of each key byte the same. Concretely,
the adversary runs 23×7 = 221 key updates on the card with ∆ = 05δ[0] . . . 0
5δ[6]0
8 ∈ F642
and δ[i] = abc ∈ F
3
2 for all possible bits a, b and c. One of these key updates will produce
a weak key, i.e., a key of the form k = α[0]β . . . α[7]β with α[i] ∈ F
5
2. Exploiting the weak
key weakness described in Section 2.6.1, after each key update A runs 8 authentication
attempts, one for each possible value of β, using the MAC values shown in Figure 2.6.
Note that a failed authentication will not affect the previously acquired access rights.
As soon as an authentication attempt succeeds the card responds with a MAC value
that univocally determines β as stated in Proposition 1. Knowing β the adversary is
able to recover the three rightmost bits of k1[i] by computing β ⊕ δ[i] for i = 0 . . . 6.
Furthermore, the three rightmost bits of k[7] are equal to β ⊕ 000 = β. In this way, the
attacker recovers 3 × 8 = 24 bits of k1 and only has to search the remaining 40 bits of
the key, using the legitimate trace eavesdropped in the beginning.
This attack can be further optimized. The restriction on the last bit of each byte
imposed by hash0 , described at the end of Section 2.6.4, reduces the number of required
key updates from 221 to almost 219. Therefore, it reduces the total number of authenti-
cation attempts to 219×8 = 222. Once the attacker has recovered the card key k1, as we
already mention in Section 2.6.4, recovering the master key is just as hard as breaking
single DES.
3 iClass Elite
HID introduces iClass Elite (a.k.a. High Security) as the solution for “those who want a
boost in security” [Cum03]. iClass Elite aims to solve the obvious limitations of having
just one single world-wide master key for all iClass systems. Instead, iClass Elite allows
customers to have a personalized master key for their own system. To this purpose,
HID has modified the key diversification algorithm, described in Section 2.5 by adding
an extra step to it. This modification only affects the way in which readers compute
the corresponding card key but does not change anything on the cards themselves. Sec-
tion 3.1 describes this key diversification algorithm in detail. Then Section 3.2 describes
two weaknesses that are later exploited in Section 3.3.
3.1 Key diversification on iClass Elite
This section describes the key diversification algorithm of iClass Elite. We first need to
introduce a number of auxiliary functions and then we explain this algorithm in detail.
Definition 13. Define the bit-rotate left function rl : F82 → F
8
2 as
rl(x0 . . . x7) = x1 . . . x7x0
Definition 14. Define the bit-rotate right function rr : F82 → F
8
2 as
rr(x0 . . . x7) = x7x0 . . . x6
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Definition 15. Define the nibble-swap function swap : F82 → F
8
2 as
swap(x0 . . . x7) = x4 . . . x7x0 . . . x3
Definition 16. Let the function hash1 : (F82)
8 → (F82)
8 be defined as
hash1(id[0] . . . id[7]) = k[0] . . . k[7]
where
k[i] = k
′
[i] mod 128, i = 0 . . . 7
k′[0] = id[0] ⊕ · · · ⊕ id[7] k
′
[4] = rr(id[4] ⊞ k
′
[2]) + 1
k′[1] = id[0] ⊞ . . .⊞ id[7] k
′
[5] = rl(id[5] ⊞ k
′
[3]) + 1
k′[2] = rr(swap(id[2] ⊞ k
′
[1])) k
′
[6] = rr(id[6] ⊞ (k
′
[4] ⊕ 0x3C))
k′[3] = rl(swap(id[3] ⊞ k
′
[0])) k
′
[7] = rl(id[7] ⊞ (k
′
[5] ⊕ 0xC3))
Definition 17. Define the rotate key function rk : (F82)
8 × N→ (F82)
8 as
rk(x[0] . . . x[7], 0) = x[0] . . . x[7]
rk(x[0] . . . x[7], n+ 1) = rk(rl(x[0]) . . . rl(x[7]), n)
Definition 18. Let the function hash2 : (F82)
8 → (F642 )
16 be defined as
hash2(k[0] . . . k[7]) = y[0]z[0] . . . y[7]z[7]
where
z[0] = DESenc(K
cus,Kcus)
y[0] = DESdec(z[0],Kcus)
z[i] = DESdec(rk(K
cus, i), z[i−1]) i = 1 . . . 7
y[i] = DESenc(rk(K
cus, i), y[i−1]) i = 1 . . . 7
Next we introduce the selected key. This key is used as input to the standard iClass key
diversification algorithm. It is computed by taking a selection of bytes from hash2(Kcus).
This selection is determined by each byte of hash1(id) seen as a byte offset within the
bitstring hash2(Kcus).
Definition 19. Let h ∈ (F82)
128. Let ksel ∈ (F82)
8 be the selected key defined as
h := hash2(Kcus)
ksel[i] := h[hash1(id)[i]] i = 0 . . . 7
The last step to compute the diversified card key is just like in iClass (see Section 2.5)
k := hash0(DESenc(k
sel, id)) .
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3.2 Weaknesses in iClass Elite
This section describes two weaknesses in the key diversification algorithm of iClass Elite.
These weaknesses are exploited in Section 3.3 to mount an attack against iClass Elite
that recovers the custom master key.
3.2.1 Redundant key diversification on iClass Elite Assume that an adversary
somehow learns the first 16 bytes of hash2(Kcus), i.e., y[0] and z[0]. Then he can simply
recover the master custom key Kcus by computing
Kcus = DESenc(z[0], y[0]) .
Furthermore, the adversary is able to verify that he has the correct Kcus by checking
the following equality
z[0] = DESenc(K
cus,Kcus) .
3.2.2 Weak key-byte selection on iClass Elite Yet another weakness within the
key diversification algorithm of iClass Elite has to do with the way in which bytes from
hash2(Kcus) are selected in order to construct the key ksel.
As described in Section 3.1, the selection of key bytes from hash2(Kcus) is deter-
mined by hash1(id). This means that only the card’s identity determines which bytes of
hash2(Kcus) are used for ksel. This constitutes a serious weakness since no secret is used
in the selection of key bytes at all. Especially considering that, for some card identities,
the same bytes of hash2(Kcus) are chosen multiple times by hash1(id). In particular,
this implies that some card keys have significantly lower entropy than others. What is
even more worrying, an adversary can compute by himself which card identities have
this feature.
3.3 Key recovery attack on iClass Elite
In order to recover a master key Kcus, an attacker proceeds as follows. First, exploit-
ing the weakness described in Section 3.2.2, the adversary builds a list of chosen card
identities like the following.
card identity id hash1(id)
00 0B 0F FF F7 FF 12 E0 01 01 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 04 0E 08 F7 FF 12 E0 78 02 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 09 0D 05 F7 FF 12 E0 7B 03 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 0A 0C 06 F7 FF 12 E0 7A 04 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 0F 0B 03 F7 FF 12 E0 7D 05 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 08 0A 0C F7 FF 12 E0 74 06 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 0D 09 09 F7 FF 12 E0 77 07 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 0E 08 0A F7 FF 12 E0 76 08 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 03 07 17 F7 FF 12 E0 69 09 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 3C 06 E0 F7 FF 12 E0 20 0A 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 01 05 1D F7 FF 12 E0 63 0B 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 02 04 1E F7 FF 12 E0 62 0C 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 07 03 1B F7 FF 12 E0 65 0D 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 00 02 24 F7 FF 12 E0 5C 0E 00 00 45 01 45 45
00 05 01 21 F7 FF 12 E0 5F 0F 00 00 45 01 45 45
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This table shows a list of 15 card identities and their corresponding key-byte selection
indices hash1(id). The selection of card identities in this table is malicious. They are
chosen such that the resulting key ksel has very low entropy (in fact, it is possible to
find several tables with similar characteristics).
For the first card identity in the table, the resulting key ksel is build out of only
three different bytes from hash2(Kcus), namely 0x00, 0x01 and 0x45. Therefore, this
key has as little as 24 bits of entropy (instead of 56). Next, the adversary will initiate
an authentication protocol run with a legitimate reader, pretending to be a card with
identity id = 0x000B0FFFF7FF12E0 as in the table. Following the authentication
protocol, the reader will return a message containing a nonce nR and a MAC with k.
The adversary will repeat this procedure for each card identity in the table, storing
a tuple < id, nC , nR,MAC > for each entry. Afterwards, off-line, the adversary tries
all 224 possibilities for bytes 0x00, 0x01 and 0x45 for the first key identity. For each
try, he computes the resulting k and recomputes the authentication run until he finds
a MAC equal to the one he got from the reader. Then he has recovered bytes 0x00,
0x01 and 0x45 from hash2(Kcus). The adversary proceeds similarly for the remaining
card identities from the table. Although, this time he already knows bytes 0x00, 0x01
and 0x45 and therefore only two bytes per identity need to be explored. This lowers
the complexity to 216 for each of the remaining entries in the table. The bytes that need
to be explored at each step are highlighted with boldface in the table. At this point
the adversary has recovered the first 16 bytes of hash2(Kcus). Finally, exploiting the
weakness described in Section 3.2.1, the adversary is able to recover the custom master
key Kcus with a total computational complexity of 225 DES encryptions.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the security of several building blocks of iClass is
unsatisfactory. We have found many vulnerabilities in the cryptography and the imple-
mentation of iClass that result in two key recovery attacks. Our first attack requires
one eavesdropped authentication trace with a genuine reader (which takes about 10ms).
Next, the adversary needs 222 authentication attempts with a card, which in practice
takes approximately six hours. To conclude the attack, the adversary needs only 240
off-line MAC computations to recover the card key. The whole attack can be executed
within a day.
For the attack against iClass Elite, an adversary only needs 15 authentication at-
tempts with a genuine reader to recover the custom master key. The computational
complexity of this attack is negligible, i.e., 225 DES encryptions. This attack can be
executed from beginning to end in less than five seconds. We have successfully executed
both attacks in practice and verified the claimed attack times.
This paper reinforces the point that has been made many times: security by obscurity
often covers up negligent designs. The built-in key diversification and especially the
function hash0 is advertised as a security feature but in fact it is a patch to circumvent
weaknesses in the cipher. A cipher is a basic building block for any secure protocol.
Experience shows that once a weakness in a cipher has been found, it is extremely difficult
to patch it in a satisfactory manner. Using a well known and community reviewed cipher
is a better alternative.
More is not always better: the key diversification algorithm of iClass Elite requires
fifteen DES operations more than iClass Standard while it achieves inferior security.
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Instead, it would have been more secure and efficient to use 3DES than computing 16
single DES operations in their ad hoc manner.
NIST have proposed a statistical test suite [RSN+01] that can be used to measure
the cryptographic strength of a cipher. Although, many weaknesses arise from mistakes
in the implementation. Best practice in the development and implementation of security
products should incorporate some form of formal verification to prevent that. For exam-
ple, systematic and automated model checking techniques proposed in [Tre08] can help
to detect and avoid implementation weaknesses like the privilege escalation in iClass.
Alternatively, formalizing the whole design in a theorem prover [Bla01, JWS11] may
reveal additional weaknesses.
In the line with the principles of responsible disclosure, we have notified the man-
ufacturer HID Global and informed them of our findings back in November 2011. Our
collaboration and communication with HID Global is ‘open and productive’. HID has
established a Product Security Reporting Center7 to encourage and improve this type
of communication.
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